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MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS AND JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT
MARIAN D. IRISH

On June 17, 1953, Mr. Justice Douglas granted a stay of execution
for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Two days earlier the Supreme Court,
on the eve of adjournment, had refused to grant any further stay.'
The Rosenbergs had appeared before the Court seven times over a
period of nine months. In addition, their many applications far review had been given painstaking consideration by the Chief Justice
as well as by several individual justices. The point of law on which Mr.Justice Douglas granted the stay
was the applicability to the proceedings against the Rosenbergs of
the penal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The point
was raised by one Edelman, a stranger to the Rosenbergs but no
stranger to the United States Supreme Court.3 The Attorney General,
outraged by Douglas' unexpected move, asked the Supreme Court
to meet at once in special session. Although the justices had already
begun to scatter on their vacations, the Chief Justice recalled them
to Washington. The special term convened with the approval of all
the associate justices except Mr. Justice Black. The Court sat on
June 18 to hear oral argument; the decision and several opinions were
handed down on June 19.
All of the justices were in agreement that Mr. Justice Douglas
was within his right and power in issuing the stay. Six of them,
however, without endorsing the wisdom or appropriateness of a death
sentence, maintained that the execution was fully covered by law and so they vacated the stay. Justices Frankfurter and Black entered
separate dissents. Both stated that they considered the time allowed
for oral argument and subsequent determination inadequate. Mr.
Justice Douglas also dissented. His simple explanation is characteristic
of his judicial philosophy: "I know deep in my heart that I am right
on the law. Knowing that, my duty is dear.""
'Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 989 (1953).
2For a review of the judicial history of the case see Rosenberg v. United States,
346 U.S. 273 (1953).
'See Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
4Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 313 (1953).

[537)
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APPOINTMENT TO THE BENCH

William Orville Douglas was appointed to the United States
Supreme Court by the late President Roosevelt in 1939 to succeed
Mr. Justice Brandeis. He was then forty-one years old, the youngest
Supreme Court appointee since Mr. Justice Story. His previous experience in public office was in the Securities Exchange Commission.
He had initially come to Washington on leave of absence from Yale
Law School, where he was Sterling Professor of Law.
It is interesting to note that the appointment was viewed somewhat
askance by the left wing. The Nation, for example, commented, "We
wonder how hardy Mr. Douglas's liberalism would prove to be in
the cold isolation of the Supreme Court."5 The Nation was suspicious
of this corporation law expert who had so successfully used a "handin-hand technique" in the adjustment of Wall Street to the Securities
Exchange regulations.
Senator Frazier talked for two days in the Senate against confirmation of the appointment. The chairman of SEC had vigorously
attacked the New York Stock Exchange only the day before President
Roosevelt laid the nomination before the Senate. The Senator recalled that until the denunciation, so fortuitous politically, SEC
had operated very smoothly on the Washington-Wall Street axis; he
noted in particular the close personal relationship between President
Martin of the Stock Exchange and Chairman Douglas of SEC. He
found even more damaging the facts that Douglas had shown no
marked interest in the current issues on agriculture and labor and
that his views on civil liberties were unknown.8
Senator Maloney, speaking on behalf of Douglas, explained that
Douglas had a special ability to draw the co-operation of business;
under his chairmanship SEC had not found it necessary to fight
compliant corporations. On the matter of civil liberties Senator
Maloney spoke firmly: "I know that there is no one within or without
the Senate who has a greater concern for the civil liberties of this
nation than has Mr. Douglas." The nomination was confirmed
62 to 4.
It seems fair to conclude that the appointment of Douglas to the
Supreme Court, though not actually displeasing, was somewhat dis5148 The Nation 278 (1939).
684 CoNe. R.c. 3706 (1989).
71d. at 3782.
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appointing to the liberals of the 1930's. His field of specialization in
the Yale Law School was corporation law; his experience as a lawyer
had been mainly with the famous "Cravath" firm in New York, whose
clientele included some of the biggest names in American finance,
commerce, and industry.
His academic colleagues, however, had some prescience of what
"Bill Douglas" might be like on the Supreme Court. Professor Karl
Llewellyn of the Columbia Law School pointed out that Douglas
was the first justice on the Supreme Court to be schooled in the modem human approach to law. Arthur L. Corbin of the Yale Law faculty
remarked, ".... whatever comes up, Bill Douglas will pass judgment of
his own mind, without regard to man, God, or devil, and he will make
up his mind as he sees what is legally right. He will think of rules
that will work, of applying the best that there is in human experience.
He is a square shooter with an able and a reasonable mind." s
Douglas was one of the pioneers in the functional approach to law
which was "The New Yale Program" in the 1930's. As a professor
of corporation law he taught his students the importance of empiricism. He rejected categorical thinking and turned his classes toward
factual analysis of social and economic forces, "from static theology to
postulates stated in terms of human behavior."9 His lectures in exposition of case law and business practice were drawn from a broad
background of politics, economics, government, and psychology. Law
for him was a dynamic, vital, social science.
On the Court Mr. Justice Douglas continued this legal realism
through an earthy, practical approach to every case. For example,
although no man on the Court distrusted more than he the practices
of "big business," he was impelled to dissent in Standard Oil Company
of California v. United States.10 The Court sustained under the
Clayton Act an injunction prohibiting Standard Oil from entering
into exclusive supply contracts for petroleum products and automobile
accessories with independent dealers. Douglas felt that these buying
agreements were actually the means of keeping small and local businesses alive and that the injunction would merely provoke the big
oil companies into building their own chains of service stations. "Our
8N.Y. Times, March 26, 1939, §8, pp. 4, 21.
gDouglas, A Functional Approach to the 2aw of Business Associations, 23 Iii.

L. REv. 673 (1928).
10337

U.S. 293 (1949).
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choice," he explained, "must be made on the basis not of abstractions
but on the realities of modem industrial life.""
STARE DECISIS AND FLEXIBILITY

Douglas' brief experience as a practicing lawyer made him somewhat cynical of the legal profession. He observed that too often the
lawyer served as high priest to finance and industry and too seldom
acted as justice and guardian of the public interest. He thought also
that the courts gave comfort and confidence to those whose wealth
came from manipulation and appropriation of other peoples' money.
His research on bankruptcy and reorganization led him to believe
that the real enemies of the public frequently were the corporation
lawyers who acted as go-betweens for the investment houses and
business enterprises. 12 He charged bar and bench alike with resistance
to basic change, with opposition to any alteration of the so-called
ancient absolutes. 13
Years later, when a justice on the Court, Douglas amplified his
views on stare decisis. He recognized that the law should not be
susceptible to whim or caprice: "It must have the sturdy qualities
required of every framework that is designed for substantial structures. " 14 He conceded that stare decisis offers stability to society: "It
is a strong tie which the future has to the past."' 5 Uniformity and
certainty are desirable expedients in law; but outworn concepts which
no longer fit the facts must be vacated. The judge should fit his
decision to the facts; if he cannot find the proper precedents he must
create new precedents.
As professor of law at Yale Douglas showed little interest in public
law. But his experience in public administration with SEC, and his
association in Washington with the group of young lawyers that
acted as "privy council" to the White House, gave him new perspectives in government and law. An ardent New Dealer, believing
with Roosevelt that the American people have a rendezvous with
destiny, Douglas was profoundly shocked by the Supreme Court's use
of stare decisis to obstruct "the dynamic component of history."' 0
"'Id. at 320.
"2Douglas, The Lawyer and the FederalSecurities Act, 3 DUKE B.A.J. 66 (1935).
"3Douglas, The Lawyer and the Public Service, 26 A.B.A.J. 633 (1940).
'4Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COL. L. REv. 735 (1949).
5Id. at 736.
1id. at

737.
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Looking realistically at the role of the judge, Mr.Justice Douglas
declared: "Precedents are made or unmade not on logic and history
alone. The choices left by the generality of a constitution relate to
policy." 17 The "Roosevelt Court" in little over a decade would reverse nearly thirty cases in constitutional law. Douglas would be a
leading spirit in this remaking of constitutional history. As he saw
it, the Court was but removing the gloss that the previous justices
had laid over the original document. He considered the return of
governmental power over social and economic affairs and the broad
extension of national authority quite consonant with the interpretations of that great chief justice, John Marshall. That constitutional
law was unsettled and in a state of flux did not disturb him. The
Constitution "must never become a code which carries the overtones
of one period that may be hostile to another."' Is
Socio-ECONO-MIC

PHILOSOPHY

When Chief Justice Stone died Mr. Justice Douglas wrote his
eulogy in the Columbia Law Review 9 and in the California Law Review.-0 Douglas had long been an admirer of Harlan Stone, first as
his student in the Columbia Law School, later as a colleague on the
Columbia law faculty, and finally as his associate on the Supreme
Court. He rated Stone one of the very best law teachers he had ever
known; in particular he respected the keen, precise mind which was
always skeptical of absolutes and inquisitive as to origins of principles.
Stone's courses at Columbia were in the field of private law, which
does not have the reach of constitutional law. But when the law
professor went to the bench he moved surely into the tradition of
Holmes and Brandeis. As Chief Justice, Stone could not act as advocate for any class, party, or race but administered equal justice
under the law. Yet it was true of him, as of all the Court, remarked
his junior associate, that "Judges are human. The social philosophy
which they had before they ascended the bench is not suddenly
2
sloughed off." '
Certainly Mr. Justice Douglas took his social philosophy with
him to the bench, where it has been the steadfast framework of his
at 739.
lSId. at 737.
19Chief Justice Stone, 46 COL. L. R1v. 693 (1946).
-OHarlan Fiske Stone- Teacher, 35 CALTF. L. REv. 4 (1947).
"'Douglas, Chief Justice Stone, 46 COL.L. Rav. 693, 694 (1946).
2Id.
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judicial decisions. Douglas has always been conscious of the fact that
he was chosen to succeed Louis Brandeis. The succession was spiritual
as well as physical. Brandeis on and off the Court fought "the curse
of bigness"; so also has Douglas, who makes an equation of size and
power, be it in government or business. Thus he remarked in United
States v. Paramount Pictures: "[Slize carries with it an opportunity
for abuse. And the fact that the power created by size was utilized
in the past to crush or prevent competition is potent evidence that
the requisite purpose or intent attends the presence of monopoly
22
power."
Like Brandeis, Douglas hits hard at all monopoly, especially the
"giants of industry," who he fears would transform our democratic
people into a nation of clerks. Douglas, in cases involving the Sherman
Act, is a judge to be feared by all combinations in restraint of trade.
His dissent in United States v. Columbia Steel Co. illustrates his main
socio-economic thesis:23
"We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should
by now have been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The
Curse of Bigness shows how size can become a menace- both
industrial and social. It can be an industrial menace because
it creates gross inequalities against existing or putative competitors. It can be a social menace -because of its control of
prices. Control of prices in the steel industry is powerful leverage on our economy. For the price of steel determines the price
of hundreds of other articles. Our price level determines in
large measure whether we have prosperity or depression - an
economy of abundance or scarcity.... In final analysis, size in
steel is the measure of the power of a handful of men over our
economy.... [A]11 power tends to develop into a government
in itself. Power that controls the economy should be in the
hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands
of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized.... That is the philosophy and the command of the
Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great that only a
government of the people should have it."
22334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
23334 U.S. 495, 535 (1948).
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The dissent in Columbia Steel is also illuminative of the justice's
predilection toward regionalism rather than nationalism. For all his
years of public experience in the East, Douglas in private life is a
Westerner. Thus he points out that he might have viewed the proposed purchase of Consolidated Steel in California somewhat differently had the purchaser been an independent west coast producer
2
instead of United States Steel: '
"The purchase might then be part of an intensely practical plan
to put together an independent western unit of the industry
with sufficient resources and strength to compete with the giants
of the industry. Approval of this acquisition works in precisely
the opposite direction. It makes dim the prospects that the
western steel industry will be free from the control of the
eastern giants."
ECONOMIc LmRALIsm
When Mr. Justice Douglas first came to the Court his interests
were still focused chiefly upon the financial and business problems
which he had considered as a professor of corporation law and actually
dealt with as administrator for SEC.25 In the 1930's it was the greater
part of "liberalism" for the Roosevelt Court to indulge in a heavy
presumption of constitutionality for all legislation regulating business
and social affairs. Over many years the Supreme Court had not only
acquiesced in the triumph of the business community in American
government but had given strong constitutional sanction to the political position of vested interests. Efforts of state legislatures to experiment with economic regulation in the form of prescribing hours of
labor, conditions of labor, minimum wages, prohibiting child labor,
or requiring certificates of convenience and necessity were nullified
by Supreme Court decisions as depriving persons, usually corporations,
of liberty or property without due process of law. In vain the liberals
quoted Justice Waite: "For protection against abuse by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."26
241d. at 539.
25By the late 1940's, however, Douglas was increasingly concerned with the
issues of civil liberties, especially with the problems which duster around the
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. In this area he was particularly influenced
by the tradition of Holmes; perhaps even more notable is his close association
with Justice Black.
26Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
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The "New Supreme Court," which by 1940 included Black, Frankfurter, Reed, Murphy, and Douglas, with striking rapidity began to
operate on the laissez faire philosophy that had become so embedded
in constitutional law after 1900. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrishr
overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital,28 which forbade legislation
establishing minimum wages. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins20 virtually overruled Carter v. Carter Coal Co.30 and thereby
opened the door to federal regulation of mining. United States v.
Darby3- in upholding minimum wage levels in effect overruled Ham2
mer v. Dagenharton child labor. And so it went. In the cases that
marked this trend the particular contribution of Mr. Justice Douglas
was the opinion in Olsen v. Nebraska,33 which overruled Ribnik v.
McBride3 4 on the matter of price fixing. Declaring that the Court
had at long last departed from the philosophy and approach of the
majority in the Ribnik case, he urged that notions of public policy
embedded in earlier Court decisions not be read into the Constitution.
"Since they do not find expression in the Constitution, we cannot
give them continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the economic and social programs of the states is to be determined."35
CIVIL LIBERTIES

While the liberals on the Court are inclined to exercise judicial
restraint in cases involving the constitutionality of economic regulation, they are much more likely to review legislation affecting civil
rights. When Douglas first went on the Court economic problems
were paramount and civil rights were rarely at issue. The dichotomy
of policy based on philosophical differentiation of "property rights"
and "human rights" was not yet conspicuous, although it had been
suggested by Chief Justice Stone in his footnote four in United States
36
v. Carolene Products:
27300 U.S. 379 (1937).
28261 U.S. 525 (1923).
29310 U.S. 381 (1940).

30298
31312
32247
33313
34277
35

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

238
100
251
236
350

(1936).
(1941).
(1918).
(1941).
(1927).

01sen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 247 (1941).
U.S. 144, 152 (1937).

36304
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"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."
The "age of the common man," hailed so joyously by the New
Deal liberals of the 1980's, had produced something of a political
Frankenstein, a "majoritarian" democracy prone to override the
rights of minorities and to disregard the liberties of the individual.
The true liberal is of course genuinely distressed when the operation
of popular government tends not only to equalize but to standardize
our way of life. Thus Mr. Justice Black, a pragmatic New Dealer but
also a natural individualist, reacts with a constitutional interpretation
that gives a preferred position to free thought and liberty of conscience. Douglas joins with Black in belief in the absolute priority
of the First Amendment. In Beauharnaisv. Illinoisl- which involved
group libel under an Illinois statute, Douglas in a strong dissent explains his judicial position:38
"In matters relating to business, finance, industrial and labor
conditions, health and the public welfare, great leeway is now
granted the legislature, for there is no guarantee in the Constitution that the status quo will be preserved against regulation
by government. Freedom of speech, however, rests on a different
constitutional basis. The First Amendment says that freedom
of speech, freedom of press, and the free exercise of religion
shall not be abridged. That is a negation of power on the part
of each and every department of government. Free speech, free
press, free exercise of religion are placed separate and apart;
they are above and beyond the police power; they are not subject to regulation in the manner of factories, slums, apartment
houses, production of oil, and the like."
Just as the "Old Court" could be charged with glossing the Constitution with the theories of a classical economy, so it might be said
that Black and Douglas have tried to improve upon the Constitution
37345 U.S. 250 (1952).
387d. at 286.
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with their own values of human rights. They not only give a preferred
position to the substantive rights granted by the First Amendment
but read into the Fourteenth Amendment a guarantee in the state
courts of those procedural rights which are specified for the federal
courts. In Adamson v. California,involving self-incrimination, Black's
dissent,39 in which he was joined by Douglas, was a historical essay
to show that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the
whole Bill of Rights applicable to the states. Murphy and Rutledge
agreed with Black and Douglas, with the discerning deviation, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment is not entirely or necessarily
to be limited by the Bill of Rights. In Bute v. Illinois,40 concerning
right to counsel, the same four dissented, with Douglas this time
speaking for all: "I do not think the constitutional standards of fairness depend on what court an accused is in. I think that the Bill of
Rights is applicable to all courts at all times."4' The proposition,
however, has never been accepted by the majority of the Court that
the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of the guarantees of the
first ten amendments or that it is limited by them.
On still another point of historical interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment Black and Douglas have agreed but have not been
able to persuade the majority of the Court to their opinion. Mr.
Justice Black, after careful research, came up with an exciting dissent
in 1938: "I do not believe the word 'person' in the Fourteenth Amendment includes corporations."4 2 In Wheeling Steel Corporation v.
Glander Douglas, in a dissent joined by Black, recalled the early
cases on the Fourteenth Amendment to show that it was not originally
intended or soon anticipated that corporations would be covered by
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Douglas concluded: 44
"It may be most desirable to give corporations this protection
from the operation of the legislative process. But that question
is not for us. It is for the people. If they want corporations to
be treated as humans are treated, if they want to grant corpora39332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
40333 U.S. 640 (1948).

41'd. at 678.
42Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938).
43337 U.S. 562 (1949).
44Id. at 581.
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tions this large degree of emancipation from state regulation,
they should say so."
To date, however, only Black and Douglas have followed this particular policy in constitutional interpretation.
No one can call Douglas one of the "hollow men" of our times.
He writes his convictions into all of his opinions. Regardless of personal views as to those convictions, his intellectual integrity and
moral strength command respect.
The "preferred position" of the First Amendment is truly a
matter of higher law to Mr. Justice Douglas. In the first flag salute
case, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,45 both Douglas and Black
concurred with Frankfurter, whom they respected as a long-standing
champion of civil rights. Frankfurter thought it was more important
that the state have power to evoke a unifying sentiment of patriotism
than that the individual be absolutely protected in his religious liberty.
He cloaked his opinion with the argument of democracy that had been
so persuasive to the economic liberals of the 1930's: "To fight out the
wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and
before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to
the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free
people."46
The press, the professors, and the lawyers were sharply critical of
the Frankfurter opinion, but state legislatures and local councils relied on the decision to enforce Americanism in the schools. Murphy,
Black, and Douglas were soon deeply disturbed by the repercussions
of the decision.
Less than a year later in Jones v. Opelika,47 involving the requirement of a municipal license for the peddling of books by Jehovah's
Witnesses, these three made public confession of their repentance.
"Since we joined in the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is
an appropriate occasion to state that we now believe that it was also
48
wrongly decided."
Shortly thereafter the appointment of Justice Rutledge to the
Court turned the minority to a majority. The question of whether
a municipality could demand a license for Jehovah's Witnesses arose
45310 U.S. 586 (1940).
46d. at 610.

47316 U.S. 584 (1942).
481d. at 623.
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again in Murdock v. Pennsylvania. Douglas spoke for the Court: 40
"The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form
of missionary evangelism-as old as the history of printing
presses.
"The fact that the ordinance is 'nondiscriminatory' is immaterial. . ... Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom
of religion are in a preferred position."
A few weeks later, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,50 Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the new majority, overruled the Gobitis decision. Black, Douglas, and Murphy concurred.
Frankfurter dissented, saying, "Of course patriotism cannot be enforced by the flag salute. But neither can the liberal spirit be enforced
by judicial invalidation of illiberal legislation." 51 But the "liberals"
on the Court had modified their own formula of judicial restraint.
More recently the issue of religious establishment has been raised
with respect to public education. In Everson v. Board of Education52
the Court upheld a state statute which allowed the local school board
to reimburse parents for money spent for public transportation to
schools, including Catholic parochial schools. Black, who delivered
the opinion for the Court, saw no breach in the wall between church
and state. "[The legislation] does no more than provide a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools. ' 5 3
Douglas joined in this decision; Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and
Burton dissented.
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education54 Black again
spoke for the Court. The case concerned released time for religious
instruction authorized in the public schools of Champaign, Illinois.
The Court found that state taxes were being used to disseminate religious doctrines in public schools and that the state was offering
sectarian groups invaluable aid by providing pupils for religious
classes through its compulsory public school machinery. Douglas
49319 U.S. 105, 108, 115 (1943).

50319
51Id.
52330
53Id.

U.S. 624 (1943).
at 670.
U.S. 1 (1947).
at 18.
54333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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associated himself with this decision. Frankfurter, Jackson, Rutledge,
and Burton also concurred, a position consistent with their dissent
in the Everson case. Only Reed dissented.
In Zorach v. Clauson-5 Justices Black and Douglas parted company, a rare occurrence. The question of released time for religious
instruction was again considered, this time in the New York City
public schools. In Champaign the religious classes were ordinarily
held in the public school buildings; in New York City the pupils
were dismissed to receive religious instruction in their own churches.
Douglas, writing the majority opinion, upheld the New York system: 56
"The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every
and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and
creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary.
"We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of
hostility to religion."
Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson each wrote separate dissents.5 7
From the outset Black and Douglas have been in almost complete agreement, whether in the heyday of the Roosevelt Court, when
they were with the majority on social legislation, or more recently,
when they are likely to be determined dissenters on civil rights.
Douglas now holds the all-time record for dissents, over fifty during
the last term. 58 Holmes, "the great dissenter," never dissented more
than sixteen times in any one term. On the present Court, however,
dissenting is the vogue. Dissents have been written in approximately
two thirds of the cases decided during the last several terms. Nearly
always Black and Douglas, and frequently Frankfurter, stand out as
articulate champions of unpopular minorities. In these totalitarian
times it takes courage to speak for an unpopular minority.
55343 U.S. 306 (1952).

zOwd. at 312, 313, 315.
17Id. at 315, 320, 323, respectively.
681t should also be noted that the hard-working Mr. Justice Douglas usually
writes more majority opinions than any other justice.
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Communism and Totalitarianism

In a lecture delivered at Brandeis University in January 1952
Mr. Justice Douglas exposed "The Black Silence of Fear." 59 The
speech, which was widely reported, subsequently received the Lauterbach Award as the most substantial contribution to the cause of civil
liberties during the year. Douglas, who had been on one of his roundthe-world expeditions, on returning to the United States was60
".. . shocked at the arrogance and intolerance of great segments of the American press, at the arrogance and intolerance
of many leaders in public office .... [T]hought is being standardized, . . . the permissible area for calm discussion is being
narrowed ... the range of ideas is being limited ....
"Irresponsible talk by irresponsible people has fanned the flames
of fear. Accusations have been loosely made. Character assassinations have become common. Suspicion has taken the place
of good-will.
"This fear has stereotyped our thinking, narrowed the range
of free public discussion, and driven many thoughtful people
to despair.
"The great danger of this period is not inflation, nor the
national debt, nor atomic warfare. The great, the critical
danger is that we will so limit or narrow the range of permissible
discussion and permissible thought that we will become victims
of the orthodox school."
Sitting on the Court, Douglas has seen the ultimate sanction given
to political uniformity and social conformity in the name of national
security. In the cold war against communism "majoritarian" democracy has tended to adopt the tactics of totalitarianism. Douglas
has voiced his objections again and again. In Dennis v. United
States6' the majority of the Court sustained the conviction of the
Communist Party leaders under the Smith Act. Only Black and
59Reprinted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1952, Sec. VI, p. 7.
6Old. at 7, 37, 38.
61341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Douglas dissented. Douglas spoke in the tradition of Holmes: 62
"Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article
of our faith.... We have counted on it to keep us from embracing what is cheap and false; we have trusted the common sense
of our people to choose the doctrine true to our genius and to
reject the rest.
"The First Amendment makes confidence in the common sense
of our people and in their maturity of judgment the great postulate of our democracy. Its philosophy is that violence is rarely,
if ever, stopped by denying civil liberties to those advocating
resort to force.... The political censor has no place in our
public debates. Unless and until extreme and necessitous circumstances are shown, our aim should be to keep speech unfettered and to allow the processes of law to be invoked only
when the provocateurs among us move from speech to action."
Douglas likewise refuses to concur in the spreading doctrine of
guilt by association. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath3 Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for the majority of the Court,
declared that organizations listed as subversive by the Attorney General have a right to judicial review. Douglas concurred on procedural
grounds but could not refrain from amplifying the constitutional
issues, adding a typical touch of his political philosophy: "In days
of great tension, when feelings run high, it is a temptation to take
short cuts by borrowing from the totalitarian techniques of our
opponents. But when we do, we set in motion a subversive influence
of our own design that destroys us from within."64
As to the validity of the requirement of the loyalty oaths which
have cropped up everywhere in the public service Douglas is likewise judicially skeptical. "I have never been able to accept the recent
doctrine that a citizen who enters the public service can be forced
to sacrifice his civil rights." 65 This view compelled his dissents in
Garner v. Board of Public Works 66 involving municipal employees
621d.

at 584, 590.

63341 U.S. 123 (1951).

at 174.
88Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 US. 485, 508 (1952).
6841 U.S. 716, 731 (1951).
641d.
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in California, and Adler v. Board of Education,"7 concerning New
York City schoolteachers.
To Douglas the First Amendment is absolute. In Terminiello v.
Chicago,8 speaking for the Court in upholding the right of a Roman
Catholic priest to stir up an angry mob with phrases fostering fascism
and anti-Semitism, he said, "Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea."869
In Feiner v. New York his dissent covered the harangue of a university student who called President Truman "a bum" and likened
the American Legion to a Nazi Gestapo: "When a speaker mounts a
platform it is not unusual to find him resorting to exaggeration, to
vilification of ideas and men, to the making of false charges." 70 Dissenting in the Beauharnaiscase, he would have extended the right of
free press to a lithograph which was offensively anti-Negro: 1
"My view is that if in any case other public interests are to
override the plain command of the First Amendment, the peril
of speech must be clear and present, leaving no room for argument, raising no doubts as to the necessity of curbing speech
in order to prevent disaster."
In United States v. Rumely, in a concurring opinion, he pointed up
the constitutional issue which Frankfurter had carefully avoided:
"Through the harassment of hearings, investigations, reports, and
subpoenas government will hold a club over speech and over the
press. Congress could not do this by law." 7 2 In Poulos v. New Hampshire the majority were willing to accept a reasonable requirement for
a license to speak in public parks; Douglas dissented: 73
".. . when a legislature undertakes to proscribe the exercise

of a citizen's constitutional right to free speech, it acts lawless.
ly I ...

"The command of the First Amendment (made applicable to
67342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952).

G8337 U.S. 1 (1949).
69ld. at 4.
70340 U.S. 315, 331 (1951).

7'Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 284 (1952 .
7273 Sup. Ct. 543, 551 (1953).
.373 Sup. Ct. 760, 775 (1953).
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the States by the Fourteenth) is that there shall be no law
which abridges those civil rights. The matter is beyond the
power of the legislature to regulate, control, or condition."
In every case the position of Mr. Justice Douglas is predictable; he
never deviates to favor the right or the left or to placate public opinion.
Admirers of Bill Douglas point out with pride- his critics view
with alarm - the fact that he uses his judicial position to implement
his personal philosophy. The American way is for him a free society
of free men. Freedom to him means above all else freedom of thought
and expression. In the face of official witch hunts and popular hysteria
he remains calm but adamant: "Our real power is our spiritual
strength, and that spiritual strength stems from our civil liberties. If
we are true to our traditions, if we are tolerant of a whole market
place of ideas, we will always be strong." 74 This is no cliche or labeled
thinking. This is what the man believes and how the justice acts no matter how blow the winds of public opinion. "Judges," he said
once in a contempt of court case, "are supposed to be men of fortitude,
able to thrive in a hardy climate."7 5 Possessed of shrewd intelligence,
driving energy, an indomitable will, and immense courage, William
Orville Douglas does not always exercise judicial restraint when he
feels that the freedom of his country calls for positive policy from
the highest court.

74Address by William 0. Douglas, Philadelphia Bulletin Forum, Mar. 3, 1952.
7Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
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